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GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE: THE
HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION
Russell K Osgoodt
Most lawyers and commentators assume that judges can and
should consistently ascertain and apply constitutional law doctrine.'
Thus, the primary epithet aimed at a purportedly erroneous judicial
decision or commentary is that it is "unprincipled." 2 What this
means is that the decision or commentary represents doctrinal inconstancy or incoherence or, at a minimum, diverges from the position supported by the critic hurling the epithet.
The assumption that a stable datum of "doctrine" exists which
courts can apply to constitutional problems conflicts with most individuals' perception of the current state of United States constitutional law. 3 It also conflicts, to some extent, with older notions of
4
the judicial function. For example, Felix Frankfurter and others
have argued that in many situations courts should refuse to rule,
withhold a ruling, or avoid a ruling by using a prudential tactic like
abstention or the political question doctrine. 5 Despite the failure of
doctrinal coherence or "principledness" 6 to eventuate and its inconsistency with Frankfurtian prudential notions, only a few have quest Professor of Law, Cornell University. The author thanks students and faculty of
law and history at the University of Glasgow, the University of Edinburgh, and Cornell
University for reading (or listening to) and commenting upon earlier versions of this
article, including Gregory Alexander, William Gordon, James Henderson, Chris Himsworth, Dennis Hutchinson, Sheri Johnson, Robert Kent, and Dale Oesterle.
I One notable exception is Phillip Bobbitt's view expressed in his book, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
2 See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971);
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Pinciples, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982 (1978);
Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).

When confronted with a difficult array of precedentJudge Bork has softened his position
to some extent. See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1395-98 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(upholding a U.S. Navy regulation requiring that homosexual sailors be discharged on
ground that Court cannot create a constitutional right to engage in homosexual activity
despite line of cases purporting to recognize privacy rights.).
3 See, e.g., Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985).
4 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 127-43 (2d ed. 1986).
5 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (Brennan, J.) (curtailing political
question doctrine); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (Frankfurter,
J.) (classic abstention case).
6 T1his essay also uses the term "doctrinality" to refer to principledness.
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tioned this underlying assumption. 7
Surely the most famous argument for principledness is Herbert
Wechsler's 1959 forward to the Harvard Law Review. 8 It is an elegant, deeply thoughtful, and erudite lecture. Like many lectures, it
glosses over major problems, but scholars continue to debate its
claims with respect. Wechsler defined a principled decision as "one
that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved." 9 He then used this theory of
principledness to criticize the holdings in Shelley v. Kraemer'0 and
Brown v. Board of Education1"and its progeny. Wechsler began his
lecture with an attack on Learned Hand and Felix Frankfurter for
endorsing prudential notions in judicial decision making.' 2 Wechsler believed that the courts must decide each case presented unless
the Constitution unequivocally commits the question to another
branch.' 3 He argued that courts should decide cases on the basis of
neutral 14 or general principles-principles not generated in political
debate for political ends. At one point in the lecture Wechsler conceded, "When no sufficient... [principled reasons] can be assigned
for overturning value choices of the other branches of the Government, or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive."' 5
Although Wechsler neither emphasized this nor illustrated it with
examples, he wrote later that articulating the amount of burden a
state may impose on interstate commerce may be "beyond the pos6
sibility of principled decision."'
7 But see infra text accompanying notes 28-31.
8 Wechsler, supra note 2. For criticism and some support of Wechsler, see Greenawalt, supra note 2; Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27
U. CH. L. REV. 661 (1960); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of ltepretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1981).
9 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 19.
10
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
'1
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 1-10.
13
Id. at 9-10. Impeachment is one example of such a commitment. Id. at 7; see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3.
14 It is interesting to speculate why Wechsler chose the word "neutral." Many
things which might be labelled constitutional principles, like racial equality, are not neutral in any sense of the term. That Wechsler meant to exclude current political considerations is clear. Perhaps he chose the word to avoid being trapped by a word like
"textual." Kent Greenawalt has the best discussion of the meaning of Wechsler's "neutral," but after reading Greenawalt's discussion, it is still not clear to me that the word
"neutral" adds much to the meaning of the word "general." See Greenawalt, supra note
2, at 985 ("A person gives a neutral reason, in Wechsler's sense, if he states a basis for a
decision that he would be willing to follow in other situations to which it applies.").
5 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 19.
I (1 Wechsler, The Nature ofJudicial Reasoning, in 1L-w AND Piiii.osoii' 290, 299 (S.
Hook ed. 1964) (emphasizing difficulty of using neutral principles in nebulous legal areas such as scope of permissible state action tinder commerce clause): se' also H. %'1-(:I1S-
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Two prominent constitutional law commentators, Robert Nagel
and Jesse Choper, have offered modifications on the notion of
principledness without deserting its central features. Nagel attacks
the recent trend in constitutional decisions to spawn and present
doctrine in formulaic terms, such as tests with "prongs," "standards," or "hurdles."' 7 Nagel argues that such formulations inevitably distance judges from the text of the Constitution, and even
worse, they fail to communicate effectively with the public, the wider
audience for Supreme Court decisions.' 8
Nagel does not, however, attack the notion that doctrine can be
elaborated. At most his article implies that courts have difficulty articulating constitutional doctrine apart from constitutional text, and
that many efforts to do so fail. Nagel suggests that lean, law-applyingjudicial decisions should be the norm,' 9 but he does not indicate
how judges can fashion such decisions from broad constitutional
language without some doctrinal elaboration.
Ironically, Nagel's distrust of complex doctrinal tests allies him
with liberal commentators who have decried the dilution of certain
constitutional guarantees through the mechanism of balancing calculi. In the most remarkable of these developments, the Court, it is
said, 20 has balanced away the right not to have one's home or person searched without a warrant procured upon a showing of probable cause in the context of grand jury proceedings 2 1 and, more
recently, when a police officer acts in good faith in procuring a war22
rant which is later found defective in some respect.
Jesse Choper also proposes a modified version of principledness. In two articles 23 which compose the core of his book Judicial
Review and the National PoliticalProcess24 Choper argues that the fed35-36 (1961) (using Holmes' clear
and present danger test as example of a neutral principle).
17 Nagel, supra note 3, at 165.
18 In a short "speculation" at the end of his article, Nagel attributes the formulaic
trend to a vision of constitutional jurisprudence in which the Supreme Court sees itself
as locked in combat with popular culture. Id. at 211-12. Thus, the Court's formulae
may represent judicial imperialism in the form of adoption of anti-democratic constraints and indicate that the Court no longer considers it necessary or desirable to communicate with the public.
LER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LA\v

19

Id.

20 LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and
Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 895.
21
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
22 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
23 Choper, The Scope of National Power l'is-d-Vis the States: The Dispensability ofJudicial
Review. 86 YALE I.J. 1552 (1977) [hereinafter Choper, Judicial Review]; Choper, The
Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice. 122 U. PA. L. RE'.
810 (1974) 1hereinafter Choper, Theory and Practice].
24 .. CioI'ER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND TIE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
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eral courts should husband their limited, institutional capital, expending it for the most part on individual rights cases. Thus, "the
federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-a-vis the
states." 25 Choper justifies avoiding federalism cases on the basis
that the issues in such cases are qualitatively different than those
considered in individual rights cases. The latter involve "principle," 2 6 whereas the former concern only the question of which en-

tity may do something, rather than whether that thing may be done
at all. Choper ends the first of his two articles by stating the assumption underlying his argument, namely, that the "central function" of judicial review is to "[curb] majoritarian abuse of the
27
constitutional liberties of the individual."
There have been two major, but isolated, attacks on the notion
of principledness. In his book ConstitutionalFate, Phillip Bobbitt suggests that some Supreme Court decisions are best viewed as the exercise of an "expressive function" in constitutional jurisprudence.
These decisions, according to Bobbitt, tend not to have a clear doctrinal or textual basis and tend not to become significant precedent. 28 At a deeper level, the exercise of this expressive function

represents the social order's continuing effort to create its own
"fate."29

Mark Tushnet has also attacked the notion of principledness
from a quasi-Marxist, semiotic perspective. 30 Actually, most of
Tushnet's attack is aimed at Wechsler's claim that doctrine can, and
should, be elaborated in terms of "neutral" principles. Tushnet argues, "Interpretivism and neutral principles, as the two leading dogmas of modern constitutional theory, are thus designed to remedy a
central problem of liberal theory by constraining the judiciary suffi31
ciently to prevent judicial tyranny."
Despite these criticisms, the assumption of principledness, or
"doctrinality," remains so universal that it deserves careful reconsideration, especially in light of several recent Supreme Court decisions. This essay attempts such an analysis in the context of three
such decisions. Bowsher v. Synar, 32 the most recent case and the one
Choper,JudicialReview. supra note 23, at 1557.
Id. at 1555-56.
27 Id. at 1579; see also Choper, Theory and Practice,supra note 23, at 858 (essential role
of judicial review in our society is to guard against certain constitutional transgressions
specifically sought to be imposed by popular majorities).
28 P. BoBarrr, supra note 1, at 196-219.
29 Id. at 233-40.
25

26

"30 Tushnet. supra note 8.
I Id. at 784-85.
32

106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
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of primary importance in this essay, involved separation of powers
within the federal system. The second case, Pennhurst State School &
Hospitalv. Halderman,3 3 concerned the allocation ofjudicial responsibility within the federal system, and the third, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 34 considered federalism in the commerce clause context.
An observer of the United States Supreme Court will immediately recognize that Bowsher, Pennhurst,and Garcia were very complex
cases, each of which came to the Court with a long pedigree of prior,
relevant decisions and commentary. As a result, it was difficult for
the Court in each case to articulate a principled statement of doctrine. The factual and doctrinal complexity of these cases might
suggest that they are not good examples on which to focus in considering the validity of the assumption of doctrinality. The proponents of principledness have, however, argued for its application in
contexts of similar complexity and constitutional importance. For
example, Robert Bork has purported to apply the doctrine in first
amendment 35 and privacy 36 cases. More importantly, it is appropriate to scrutinize the assumption of doctrinality in the context of the
more difficult and fundamental questions of constitutional law because it is in this context that doctrinality is allegedly the most
helpful.
The notion that courts can and should articulate doctrine so
that it produces discrete portions of truth which, when fitted together like a puzzle, display the constitutional law of the United
States is difficult to test. On the one hand, if a particular decision,
like Bowsher, is labelled incoherent, then the proponents of
principledness argue that the problem is with the decision, the commentator evaluating the decision, or both. On the other hand, if
one starts with a single statement of doctrinal principle, for instance
Bork's theory of the core meaning of the first amendment, 37 and
applies it to a particular case, the application rarely confronts the
mass of available precedent or other data. The inherent difficulty in
testing doctrinality may be the reason that it has lived such a long
33
34

465 U.S. 89 (1984).
469 U.S. 528 (1985).

35 See, e.g., Lebron v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 896 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J.,) (striking down WMT1A's rejection of a poster based on its political content); see also Bork, supra note 2 (discussing Wechsler's concept of "neutral principles" in
the context of the first amendment).
36
See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding Navy
regulation requiring discharge of homosexual sailors despite argument that it violated
privacy interest).
37
Bork, supra note 2, at 29. ("[The core of the first amendment [is] speech that is
explicitly political.").
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and unqualified life in the minds of many lawyers, but it is not a
reason not to continue the intellectual testing.
This essay will analyze Bowsher, Pennhurst, and Garcia to test the
validity of the claim that constitutional law can usually be articulated
in terms of enduring doctrinal formulations. The case law on separation of powers and federalism, analyzed here, refutes this claim.
Instead, the Constitution provides an historical framework 38 which
throws the three branches of the federal government and the various components of the federal system into a perpetual state of possible competition and confrontation. 39 In this framework the
underlying social order generates over time the answers as well as
the constitutional questions.
My argument, that historical context 4 ° is a significant and
changeable determinant in constitutional decision making, further
justifies focusing on these three cases in a symposium about Bowsher:
Other constitutional and structural developments in the federal system provide an important part of the historical context for Bowsher.
Thus, both Pennhurst and Garciaare directly relevant to a deeper understanding of Bowsher.
This essay will discuss each case first in doctrinal terms and secondly in terms of some tentative historical perspectives. Next, the
essay will develop the theory of an historical constitution. The essay
will end with an analysis of the three cases in terms of that theory.

38 I am not arguing that all legal decisions are existentialist acts or that law is radically indeterminate. Nor am I even saying that law is likely to be used as an instrument in
a Marxist class struggle. I am saying that articulations of law are always and necessarily
incomplete and tentative. Because of the nature of human society and behavior and
other historical variables, for each final exposition of any constitutional provision there
will always arise new questions and new needs that will require reformulations and recreations of rules or propositions once perceived as final doctrinal expositions of dogmatic significance.
39
As the frequently quiescent operation of the government demonstrates, competition and confrontation are not necessary conditions at all times and on all issues.
40
Explaining these three cases under a theory of an historical constitution is obviously quite different from the approach of constitutional historians who normally describe in detail the context of a single decision or series of decisions. Examples of this
mode of historical scholarship include Friedman, A Searchfor Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon in Context, 4 LAW & HIST. REv. 1 (1986), and Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-58, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979). These
discrete studies are valuable, but I think that the historical perspective need not always
be focused narrowly-it can be applied across types of cases and over long periods of
time. Needless to say, the risks of superficiality and distortion increase with the use of
such an approach.
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I
BOWSHER iV SYNAR

A.

The Decisions

The three judge district court in Synar v. United States4 1 and the
Supreme Court on an expedited appeal in Bowsher v. Synar 4 2 found
unconstitutional the mandatory appropriation reduction mechanisms of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985 ("the Act"). 4 3 However, the various opinions of the two courts
and the Supreme Court's two dissenters 4 4 analyze and apply doctrine in this case quite differently.
1.

The District Court Opinion

The per curiam district court opinion, commonly attributed to
Judge (now Justice) Antonin Scalia, is divided into three parts. In
the first part the district court concluded that Congressman Synar
and the other plaintiffs had standing to sue.4 5 In the second part the
court rejected the challengers' claim that the Act constituted an impermissible delegation of legislative power by the legislative
branch. 46 Although the court asserted that it need not decide the
delegation issue, 4 7 it weighed the issue fully in order to present the
Supreme Court with a full record of the case, thereby forestalling a
remand should the high court reverse on the separation of powers
issue. 4 8 In the third part of the opinion, the district court agreed
with the challengers' claim that the appropriation reduction procedure violated the doctrine of the separation of powers. 49 The court
held that although the Comptroller performed essentially executive
functions under the Act, he was a creature of the legislative branch.
Giving such power over executive functions to Congress violates
the fundamental principle expressed by Montesquieu upon which
the theory of separated powers rests: "When the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehension may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact ty41 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986).
42
106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
43 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (popularly known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
44 Justices White, Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3205, and Blackmun, id. at 3215.
45 Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1379.
46 Id. at 1382.
47 Id. ("It is strictly unnecessary for us to reach this point, since we hold in Part IV
of this opinion that the challenged provisions of the Act are unconstitutional on other
grounds.").

48

Id. at 1382-83.

49

Id. at 1391.
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' 50
rannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."

There were two necessary predicates to the district court's decision. First, it concluded that the Comptroller performed an essentially executive function.
Under subsection 251(b)(1), the Comptroller General must specify levels of anticipated revenue and expenditure that determine
the gross amount which must be sequestered .... The first of
these specifications requires the exercise of substantial judgment
concerning present and future facts that affect the application of
the law-the sort of power normally conferred upon the executive
officer charged with implementing a statute. The second specification requires an interpretation of the law enacted by Congress,
similarly a power normally committed initially to the Executive
under the Constitution's prescription that he "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." 5 1
The second predicate was the district court's holding that the
Comptroller was a legislative branch official. The district court
based this conclusion on the determination that the Comptroller
was removable only as a result of a congressional initiative. In so
ruling, the court implicitly minimized the importance of the President's veto power over any congressional initiative to remove the
52
Comptroller.
2.

The Supreme Court Opinion

a. The Majority Opinion. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's result. In his opinion for six justices, ChiefJustice Burger first concluded that no consideration of the question of
Congressman Synar's standing was necessary because the Treasury
employees' union and at least one named employee plaintiff clearly
had standing. 53 At the end of the opinion, in a footnote, ChiefJustice Burger summarily disposed of the delegation issue by stating
that resolution of the delegation issue was unnecessary in view of
54
the Court's decision on separation of powers.
The Chief Justice's opinion is, therefore, largely confined to a
discussion of the "constitutionally imposed" separation-of-powers
50 Id. at 1401-02 (quoting C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAws, vol. I, bk. XI, ch.
6, at 152 (London 1823)).
51 Id. at 1400.
52
Id. at 1401. It is,
therefore, puzzling and inaccurate for the district court to have
written the following: "The statute governing removal of the Comptroller General, by
contrast, eliminates all presidential power of removal, and-much beyond that-confers
the power of removal upon Congress." Id.
53 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3186.
54
Id. at 3193 n.10.
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issue. The majority55 agreed with the district court that the Act violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because the Comptroller
performed an essentially executive function 56 yet was removable
57
only at the initiative of the legislative branch.
b. Stevens' Concurrence. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. In a separate opinion he found that the doctrine of separation of powers was violated because the Comptroller General,
viewed functionally, is a member of the legislative branch "because of
his longstanding statutory responsibilities." 5 8 Whereas Scalia and
Burger relied on removal procedures in labeling the Comptroller a
member of the legislative branch, Stevens found the Comptroller's
traditional responsibilities and institutional identification with the
legislative branch to be the crucial and fatal connections. 59 Stevens
concluded,
[W]hen Congress, or a component or an agent of Congress, seeks
to make policy that will bind the Nation, it must follow the procedures mandated by Article I of the Constitution-through passage
by both Houses and presentment to the President. In short, Congress may not exercise its fundamental power to formulate national policy by delegating that power to one of its two Houses, to
a legislative committee, or to an individual agent of the Congress
60

c. The Dissenting Opinions. Justice White dissented from the
judgment. He was not satisfied that the Comptroller should be
viewed as a creature of the legislative branch. 6 ' In addition, Justice
White disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the Comptroller's function under the Act could confidently be labelled an execu62
tive function.
55 In reaching this result, the majority quoted Madison's allusion to Montesquieu in
The FederalistNo. 47: "[T]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates .... 106 S. Ct. at 3186
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325 (U. Madison) U. Cooke ed. 1961)).
56 Id. at 3188-92.
57 Id. at 3192. In their appeal to the Supreme Court the defenders of GrammRudman-Hollings challenged vigorously the remedy selected by the district court. The
district court remedy invalidated part of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings rather than the fiftyyear-old statute which fixed the Comptroller's tenure of office. Chief Justice Burger
rejected this challenge, asserting that the Act's fallback procedure (which replaced sequestration with joint resolutions to reduce any excess appropriations) "settles the
[remedy] issue." Id. at 3193. Although the district court did not address this issue, the
ChiefJustice's discussion of this issue was presaged to some extent in the district court's
discussion of the ripeness aspect of the separation of powers question. Synar, 626 F.
Supp. at 1392.
58 Bowsher, 106 S.Ct. at 3194 (Stevens, J., concurring).

59
60
61
62

Id. at 3196-98.

Id. at 3194.
Id. at 3208 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3206-08.
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Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice White but further dissented with respect to the majority's remedy. 6 According to Blackmun, "the only sensible way to choose between two conjunctively
unconstitutional statutory provisions is to determine which provision can be invalidated with the least disruption of congressional
objectives."'6 4 Blackmun felt that the least disruptive route was to
strike down the tenure act; alternatively, the Court should not enforce that provision when and if anyone tries to remove a
comptroller.
B.

Structure Issues
1. Delegation

While the standing and remedies issues in Bowsher are quite interesting, the central concerns of both courts were the plaintiffs'
structural functions arguments. With respect to the delegation doctrine issues, the district court opinion stands alone. That court rejected the notion that the delegation doctrine is moribund, although
it conceded, "Pragmatically... the Court's decisions display a much
greater deference to Congress' power to delegate." 65 The district
court further rejected a narrow formulation of the delegation doctrine that would only prohibit delegation of certain "core functions"
of the legislative branch. 6 6 Rather, he adhered to the traditional notion that the doctrine requires that delegating legislation provide an
adequately "intelligible principle" 6 7 to guide and confine administrative decision making. Under this analysis the court found that the
provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act provided a suffi68
ciently intelligible principle.
The district court also rejected a delegation challenge against
section 274(h) of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which precluded judicial review of "[t]he economic data, assumptions, and
methodologies used by the Comptroller General in computing the
base levels of total revenues and total budget outlays." 69 The court
sustained this provision because the Act's overall constitutionality
remained subject to judicial review and "the exercise of many validly
70
delegated authorities is statutorily insulated from judicial review."
Because the Supreme Court did not reach the delegation issue
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 3215 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3216.
Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1384.
Id. at 1385.
Id. at 1389.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1390.
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in Bowsher, the delegation doctrine's current status remains in
doubt. Unfortunately, many of the questions raised in Bowsher concerning the delegation doctrine are directly relevant to resolving
what the Court isolated as "the separation-of-powers" issue. For
example, the major post-Schechter71 delegation cases 7 2 have not
found any delegations excessive. Most of the statutes reviewed in
those cases involved substantial delegations of discretionary law-for7
mulating powers to the executive branch or independent agencies. "
Therefore, it is unclear what would constitute an impermissible delegation. Similarly, it seems impossible in light of post-Schechter developments to maintain that the executive branch and independent
agencies do not perform functions which are at least partially legislative in character. If this is the case, then Bowsher's assumption that
each branch may only perform certain determinate, assigned functions is seriously undermined.
2.

Separationof Powers

The district court and the Supreme Court agreed that the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act violated the separation-of-powers
doctrine. The Constitution, of course, establishes no unitary doctrine of the separation of powers. Rather, the notion of separated
powers is reflected in several constitutional provisions and the
works of Montesquieu, which undeniably affected the design of the
Constitution of 1787.74
Reading the Constitution with regard to structure, articles I, 11,
and III respectively confer legislative, executive, and judicial power
on the separate branches of the federal government: Congress, the
President, and the federal courts. However, there is considerable
overlap of these functions. The President plays a legislative role in
71
72

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975); Fahey v. Mallo-

nee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516 (1944).
73
See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (upholding congressional
delegation of power to regulate distribution of alcoholic beverages on Indian reservation to reservation's tribal council); United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537 (1950) (upholding congressional delegation to Secretary of State and Attorney General of power to promulgate regulations under which aliens may be excluded); Bowles
v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (upholding delegation of power to fix rents pursuant
to Emergency Price Controls Act to Price Administrator); National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding delegation of power to FCC to make
regulations in public interest).
74 The leading scholar on the history of the idea of separated powers has concluded, however, that the framers of the United States Constitution did not accept the
extreme, French version of the idea. Rather, the Constitution adopts a conception of
checks and balances which requires the branches to interact rather than be totally isolated from each other. See M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
119-75 (1967).
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vetoing or approving proposed legislation. 75 Judicial review by the
courts presupposes scrutiny of the validity of the executive and legislative branches' actions. Finally, Congress has the power to block
certain appointments, reject treaties and other executive agreements, and control to some extent the jurisdiction and structure of
76
the federal courts.
a. Executive and Legislative Functions. Bowsher assumes that the
courts are able to label certain governmental functions as either legislative or executive. Both Burger for the Supreme Court 77 and the
district court 7 8 based their invalidation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget reduction sequestration procedure on their conclusions that the Comptroller was to perform, at least in part, an
executive function.
The Constitution provides no sure guide for determining what
is an executive, legislative, or judicial function. As the district court
opinion demonstrates, 79 cases abound in which the courts have permitted performance of judicial functions normally within the grant
of article III by article I executive branch officials. 80 However, in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 8 1 the Court
declared provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 197882 unconstitu83
tional because it conferred article III powers on article I judges.
And in Buckley v. Valeo, 8 4 the Court held that a portion of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197185 was
invalid because it conferred adjudicative and executive functions on
commissioners of the Federal Election Commission not appointed
pursuant to the appointments clause of the Constitution. 8 6 Both decisions strike down statutory schemes based on an impermissible assignment of functions, but neither opinion provides significant
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, §§ 1-2.
77 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
78 Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1400. Congress attempted to make the Comptroller appear to act ministerially rather than to exercise discretion in making policy judgments
because of the threat of a separation of powers challenge. Both courts, however, rejected this effort. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192; Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1399-1400.
79 Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1399-1403.
80 See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (holding findings of fact by deputy commissioner of United States Compensation Commission in suit for compensation
by injured maritime employee final).
81 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
82 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2657 (1978).
83 Article I judges are not life tenured. U.S. CoNT. art. I, § 8.
84 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
85 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 310-315, 88 Stat.
1263, 1280-87 (1974) (amending Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971)).
86 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140. Some commissioners were appointed by the Speaker of
the House, some by the President, and some by the Senate leadership.
75
76
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discussion of or guidance about how one identifies these three purportedly discrete functions.
Thus, a central feature of Bowsher, the ability to identify executive functions and to proscribe nonexecutive officials from exercising them, is tremendously indefinite. As the district court
recognized (but the Supreme Court did not), past decisions permitting congressional limits on the President's removal power, approving the existence of federal agencies substantially independent of
the President, or approving legislative delegations have characterized such officials and agencies as "quasi-judicial," "legislative
courts," or some other branch amalgam.8 7 Therefore, to hold that
the Comptroller is an executive branch official because he "execute[s] the laws ' 8 8 or because he has considerable discretion8 9 only
begins the analysis. 90 Nevertheless, the two courts reached their respective conclusions based on these generalities.
b. Executive v. Legislative Officials. A second crucial premise in
both the district court and Burger opinions is that courts can identify an individual as a member of the executive or legislative branch
on the basis of his tenure of office and that the Comptroller was,
based on applying this method, a legislative branch official or agent.
As the district court recognized, however, the line of cases concerning the President's removal power is difficult to reconcile and sheds
only indirect light on the question of whether the Comptroller is
more appropriately a legislative or an executive official. 9 1
Both Burger and the district court concluded that the power to
remove the Comptroller rested with Congress alone and therefore
characterized him as a legislative branch official. The Chief Justice
wrote:
Although the President could veto such ajoint resolution, the
veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of
Congress. Thus, the Comptroller General could be removed in
the face of Presidential opposition. Like the District Court.... we
therefore read the removal provision as authorizing removal by
92
Congress alone.
This startling conclusion is especially curious in light of the Court's
87

SVnra; 626 F. Supp. at 1396-97.

88

Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189.

Syria?;
626 F. Supp. at 1403.
Presumably all governmental officials and most citizens "execute" the laws in
certain situations. And, as modern notions ofjurisprudence or political theory tell us.
judges and legislators both have considerable discretion in the performance of their
89

9o

jobs.
Synrn; 626 F. Supp. at 1393.
Bowsher. 106 S. Ct.at 3189 n.7 (citing district court opinion, 626 F. Supp. at 1393
n.2 1).
91

92
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reasoning in INS v. Chadha,93 in which it held legislative vetoes unconstitutional because the President had no role in the process. At
the least, Chief'Justice Burger's view that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act authorized removal by Congress alone overstates what the
Act, in fact, provided.
c. The Removal Cases. The cases involving the President's removal power play two roles in Bowsher, although neither court explicitly recognized this dual role. First, they provide indirect
evidence about the branch to which the Comptroller properly belongs. Second, they involve the issue, also embedded in Bowsher,
whether the congressional power to remove the Comptroller encroached upon the President's constitutional appointments power.94
Both opinions blended indistinguishably consideration of this second issue into the first.
The five major removal cases 9 5 decided by the Supreme Court
have involved questions different from those in Bowsher; specifically,
those cases considered whether and in what ways Congress may
limit the executive branch's power to remove an official. The first
two cases involved interpretations of statutory removal provisions.
United States v. Perkins96 concerned a naval cadet dismissed by the
Secretary of the Navy for a reason not specified in the statute setting
the terms of his office. The cadet sued for and won an award of back
pay. The Court held that Congress may "restrict the [executive
branch's] power of removal as it deems best for the public interest"
and that, therefore, the cadet could not be dismissed except pursuant to the statute. 9 7 In Shurtleffv. United States9 8 the Court construed
a tenure statute to provide that President McKinley had residual
power to dismiss a government appraiser appointed with Senate
confirmation. The tenure statute enumerated certain reasons which
could lead to a dismissal 99 but the court held, in effect, that the
enumeration was non-exclusive. 1 0 0
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl.2.
95 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Ex'rv. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Shurtleff v. United
States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
A sixth
case, Exparle Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839), concerned whether a district court
judge had an implied power to remove a clerk he had appointed. The Court held that
one could properly infer under the Constitution that the power to appoint carried with it
the power to remove "[iln the absence of all constitutional provision, or statutory regulation." Id. at 259.
96 116 U.S. 483 (1886).
93
94

97

Id. at 485.

98 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
99 The enumerated reasons for dismissal included "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office." Id. at 313.
t)

Shurtleff and Perkins are reconcilable only as exercises in statutory interpretation.
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The remaining three cases do not involve fairly pure questions
of statutory interpretation but consider whether the statute, as
clearly drafted, violated the Constitution. Myers v. United States 10 1 is
the most significant of these removal cases. The Supreme Court in
Myers invalidated a statute which required that the Senate advise and
consent to the removal, as well as the appointment, of a postmaster.
In a long opinion, ChiefJustice Taft held that Congress could not so
limit the President's power over certain employees performing exec04
utive functions. 10 2 Justice Holmes10 3 and Justice McReynolds
dissented in part because they saw no way to determine what was an
executive, as opposed to a legislative, function. Holmes also felt
that the President's duty to execute the laws included executing laws
which required the advice and consent of Congress or the Senate in
a removal. 10 5
Taft's opinion in Myers reaches three interrelated conclusions.
First, the Constitution generally separates and isolates the exercise
of the three functions of government.' 0 6 Second, appointment and
removal of officers of the United States pursuant to article II, section 2, clause 2 is an executive function; thus the President should
have free removal power.10 7 Third, the inference of a free presidential removal power over officers of the United States is supported
In Perkins the Court interpreted the statute's removal provisions to be exclusive and

upheld them; in Shurtleff the Court interpreted the removal provisions to be nonexclusive and therefore never reached the constitutional question.
101
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
102
Taft's opinion presaged the opinion of Justice Sutherland the next term in
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), in which the Court, in a quo warranto
proceeding, denied the validity of colonial legislative branch appointments of directors
of the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank. Justice Sutherland

wrote, "[Tihe legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office ...
Id. at 202. Justice Holmes, in dissent, responded,
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise
it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction be-

tween legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitu-

tion requires.
Id. at 211.

Springer is one of a group of United States Supreme Court decisions rejecting various facets of the legal structure of the American colonial administration in the Philippines. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926); Carino v. Philippine Islands,
212 U.S. 449 (1909); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). While it is hard to
generalize, these decisions seems to impose most aspects of the American legal order on
the colonial government. Chief Justice Taft, who was on the Court at the time of
Springer, had previously served as a colonial administrator in the Philippines.
103
Vyets, 272 U.S. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 178 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1065 Id. at 108-09 (majority opinion).
107

Id. at 176.
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both by historical practice' 08 and by the requirement that the President alone must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 0 9
Taft concluded that "the provision of the law of 1876, by which the
unrestricted power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to
the President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid."'' °
The Court's opinion in Myers goes beyond prohibiting congressional participation in removals to bar any limitation on the President's removal power over officers of the United States. At the
same time, Taft reaffirmed the conclusion reached in Perkins that
Congress could by statute restrict or limit a department head's removal power over officials who were not officers of the United States
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate:
The Perkins case is limited to the vesting by Congress of the appointment of an inferior officer in the head of a department.... If
[Congress] does not choose to entrust the appointment of such
inferior officers to less authority than the President with the consent of the Senate, it has no power of providing for their
removal. "I I
Thus, Taft's decision relied more on the statute's interference with
the President's power than on congressional involvement in the removal process.
The next removal case, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, t" 2
was decided in the midst of a major battle between the Court and
the President but not one between the President and Congress.
President Franklin Roosevelt purported to dismiss a commissioner
of the Federal Trade Commission but did not claim to be exercising
108
First, Taft relied particularly on the Decision of 1789, in which Congress determined not to enact a proviso that the head of an executive branch department could be
dismissed by the President without Senate consent even though the Senate had confirmed his appointment. Id. at 114-15.
Second, Taft carefully minimized the significance of the statement in FederalistPaper

No. 77 that the Senate would have to advise and consent to the removal as well as the
appointment of executive branch officials on the basis that its author, Alexander Hamilton, later changed his mind. Id. at 136-37.
Third, Taft mentioned Andrew Jackson's message of February 10, 1835 in which
Jackson claimed that the president had exclusive and plenary removal power over executive branch officials. Id. at 158-61.
Finally, Taft discussed the major controversy that ensued when the post-Civil War
congresses, opposed to President AndrewJohnson, passed the Tenure-of-Office Act, ch.
154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), which provided that certain executive department officials were
to serve until their successors had been confirmed. Myers, 272 U.S. at 165-68. This act
was repealed in 1887. Ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500 (1887). Taft rejected the argument that the
tenure acts were solid precedent for the 1876 statute requiring advice and consent for
the removal of a postmaster. Myers, 272 U.S. at 175-76.
10)
U.S. CONST. art. II § 3.
110 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
M'' Id. at 162.
112 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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a statutory removal power. The underlying act provided for removal only in certain circumstances. Roosevelt argued that Myers
recognized a residual power in the President to dismiss any execu1 13
tive branch employee without cause.
Justice Sutherland, one of Roosevelt's protagonists in the larger
struggle, wrote the majority opinion in Humphrey's Executor. He rejected Roosevelt's argument and held that Myers was confined to
"purely executive" officers.1 1 4 By contrast, a Federal Trade Commissioner's "duties are neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative." 1 5
Sutherland
concluded that the Commission was not part of the executive
branch"16 and, therefore, that the case was not controlled by
Myers. 117
The final removal case, Wiener v. United States," 8 concerned the
validity of President Eisenhower's dismissal without cause of a commissioner of the War Claims Commission appointed with Senate
confirmation."19 The Court awarded back pay to Wiener; it relied
on the framework of Humphrey's Executor and concluded that Wiener
was exercising quasi-judicial functions. The Court reached this result even though the statute in question was quite similar to the one
in Shurtleff which the Court had interpreted the other way.
The five removal cases establish several guidelines about removability. First, Congress may not limit the President's power to
remove a member of the executive branch who is an officer of the
United States by requiring Congress to advise and consent in a removal. Second, Congress may limit the reasons for which a department head may remove other executive branch employees who are
not officers of the United States. Third, Congress may limit the
power of the President to remove certain officers of the United
States who are performing nonexecutive branch functions. Fourth,
the Court has never approved explicit statutory limitations on the
President's power to remove an officer of the United States even
without congressional participation; indeed, the Shurtleff Court construed a fairly clear statute to avoid such a limitation.
The removal cases do not support either court's conclusions in
Id. at 626.
Id. at 632.
115 Id. at 624.
116
Id. at 628.
117 Although the district court suggested in Synar that the underlying logic of the
result in Humphrey's Executor was no longer valid, 626 F. Supp. at 1397, it treated the
result in that case (and the four others) as still binding. ChiefJustice Burger relied on
Humphrey s Executor in Bowsher as general support for the notion that separation-of-powers considerations affect appointments and removal cases. Bowshey, 106 S. Ct. at 3188.
118 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
1
Id. at 350.
'13

114
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Bowsher regarding the branch to which the Comptroller belonged
and the extent of the President's powers under the appointments
clause. First, the removal cases provide no direct authority as to
what constitutes an executive function; in fact, they declare that certain law-executing activities are quasi-judicial. Second, while the result in Myers supports the conclusion reached in Bowsher on the
appointments clause issue, the Myers logic, applied consistently,
would go far beyond Bowsher and the Act. The Court in Myers reasoned that Congress may impose no limitation on a President's right
to remove officers of the United States. This conclusion could invalidate the current tenure of many important governmental officials or
lead to the demise of independent regulatory agencies within the
executive branch. Taft's Myers decision, if accepted fully, would also
allow Congress to limit significantly the grounds for removing only
those executive branch officials who are not officers of the United
States.
3.

INS v. Chadha

Bowsher came shortly after the Court's decisions in INS v.
Chadha120 and Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co. 121 In both decisions the Court struck down significant legislation based on interpretations of the general notion of separated
powers. Chadha was still on the minds of all members of the
Supreme Court as they decided Bowsher: the Court's majority opinion, like the district court's before it, struggled to squeeze Bowsher
into the Chadha mold. In Chadha the legislative veto was held unconstitutional because less than the entire constitutional legislative
branch could alter the design or the implementation of the law. 12 2
Thus, in Bowsher, both Chief Justice Burger 123 and the district
court 1 24 concluded that despite the President's role in the removal
process, Congress, by virtue of its power to override a presidential
veto, has ultimate control over that process. Justice White correctly
pointed out the Court's quick elision of this point. 12 5
Chadha sheds little direct light on the separation-of-powers
question raised in Bowsher. Although the majority opinion in Chadha
120

462 U.S. 919 (1983).

121

458 U.S. 50 (1982).

122 The Court stressed the constitutional requirements of presidential presentment
and bicameralism. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-51.
123 Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189 n.7.
124 Syn.a; 626 F. Supp. at 1401.
12.5 Bowshe; 106 S. Ct. at 3209-10 (White,J, dissenting).Justice White noted that the
majority ignored the difference between the legislative veto in Chadha and the congressional removal provision in Bowsher. Under the latter, Congress can remove the Comptroller only by joint resolution which must pass both houses and be signed by the
president or repass with two-thirds majorities after a presidential rejection. Id. at 3210.
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concludes that the veto was an impermissible exercise of legislative
power 1 26 and thus rests, like Bowsher, on a delineation of legislative
and executive functions, the opinion fails to explain why the determination of whether to deport could be delegated to the Attorney
General. 12 7 Furthermore, most observers would probably agree
that the particular governmental action taken in Chadha constituted
the exercise of either an executive or judicial, rather than legislative,
function.
C.

The Expressive Function?

One explanation for the doctrinal sponginess and confusion in
Bowsher and the other separation-of-powers cases is that these cases
represent an exercise of an expressive function of constitutional law.
128
Phillip Bobbitt has offered this explanation in other contexts.
Thus, according to Bobbitt, National League of Cities v. Usery 129 was
essentially a nondoctrinally quantifiable assertion of the continued
importance of the federal system. Similarly, Bowsher and Chadha may
be imprecise reminders to the participants in the national political
arena of the continued importance of separated powers and
functions.
D.

An Historical Approach

Bobbitt's expressive function theory may partially explain cases
like Bowsher, but one can say more. In areas of general constitutional prescription, a dynamic underlying social and political order,
even one committed to a continuing reverence for the text of the
Constitution, has the maximum ability to create, change, and recreate the very core of those general constitutional understandings.
In this context, the naturally competitive forces of a society and the
segments of its governmental structure conflict. The tension created by this structural conflict shapes the content of the Court's expression in cases like Bowsher.
Both the Supreme Court and the district court in Bowsher are
inclined to desert the rationale of Humphrey's Executor while keeping
its holding. At the same time, although both courts rely heavily on
Myers, they ignore its basic premise that Congress's power to control
the tenure of executive branch officials should be severely limited.
Ciadia, 462 U.S. at 951-59.
In a footnote the Court responds to this argument by stating that "[this] kind of
Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized
it." Id. at 953 n.16. Presumably, the President had approved the legislative veto on
numerous occasions.
128
P. BOBMT-r, supra note 1, at 196-219.
129 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
126
127
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In neither Bowsher opinion is there a precise delineation of what
Congress did that caused it to cross the forbidden line. Conversely,
there is no limitation on, or even recognition of, the existence of
considerable cross-branch functioning.
Although doctrine provides no sure explanation of Bowsher, history may. Both Bowsher and Chadha seem to reflect the continuing
fear that the presidency had been attacked or weakened in the postWatergate, post-Vietnam era. ChiefJustice Burger asserted in Bowsher, "The dangers of Congressional usurpation of Executive Branch
functions have long been recognized."'' 3 0
Similarly, Myers was
handed down during the relatively weak presidency of Calvin Coolidge. By contrast, Humphrey's Executor was decided at a time when
fear of presidential domination was significant.
History is complex and legal decisions do not follow in direct
response to the crises and headlines of the moment. But it would
not be odd to find that judges, particularly conservative judges, interpreting very general and imprecise notions of separated powers
would tilt against what they perceive as an era's aggressive force in
order to sustain competition and balance at the heart of the government. As ChiefJustice Burger stated, "[T]his system of division and
separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance
at times,"'' 1 but its goal is the avoidance of tyranny.
Bowsher also reflects a theme in American constitutional history
broader than one could make out from a minute contextualization
of the separation-of-powers cases. Bowsher represents a fear of concentrations of power. Two major episodes in constitutional history
illustrating this theme are the Supreme Court's acceptance of federal and, to a lesser extent, state railroad rate regulation 13 2 and the
federal antitrust laws. 13 3 The Court upheld these statutory schemes
in the face of the enormous power of the interests arrayed against
such regulation and the comparative weakness of the public sector.
More recently, the Court's decisions in Chadha, Buckley, and now
130
131
132

106 S. Ct. at 3189.
Id. at 3187.
See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (Shreveport

Rate Case); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (condemnation of railroad property upheld in face of due process challenge); see also Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding state regulation of prices of grain warehouses).
133 See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (dissolving combination scheme between Great Northern and Northern Pacific railways); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (breaking up interstate (e.g., commerce)
aspects of combination of iron-pipe manufacturers); United States v. E.C. Knight Co..
156 U.S. 1 (1895) (implicitly approving antitrust law but holding that sugar refining was
part of manufacturing and, therefore, not part of commerce). It is, of course, true that
in some of the early cases like E.C. Knight, particular monopolies were declared not covered by the antitrust laws because manufacturing was not considered a part of interstate
commerce and was therefore not subject to federal regulation.
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Bowsher have revived this theme and transported it to justify careful
consideration of power relationships in the national government.
In sum, Bowsher is not the natural outcome of a process of everperfecting doctrinal development. Nor is it the product of irrational
or random events or of an inexorable class struggle. Rather, it
seems to reflect a continuing judicial and societal adherence to a
fear of concentrations of power. The cases discussed can thus be
explained as continuing adjustments countering perceived concentrations of power. That Congress might become the object of this
fear in the era of the modem presidency could not have been predicted twenty-five years ago. After the shocks 134 of those twenty-five
years, though, the Court seems to be attempting to maintain a balance in the national government. This process has involved striking
down innovations in the interaction between the legislative and executive branches and protecting the judiciary's exclusive territory
more vigorously than past precedents would have suggested.
II
PENNHURST

PennhurstState School & Hospitalv. Halderman'3 5 was a procedurally complex pendent jurisdiction case. Residents of a Pennsylvania
facility for the mentally retarded had challenged the conditions of
their care. The plaintiffs brought their claim in federal court based
on the fourteenth amendment due process clause and federal and
state statutes establishing rehabilitation programs for retarded people. 13 6 The Court of Appeals, in a ruling which directly preceded
Supreme Court consideration, found that a state statute had been
violated, awarded damages, and ordered state officials to upgrade
the facility in various ways. 13 7 The Court of Appeals did not reach
the federal issues in part because of the judicial doctrine that cases
should be disposed of on a non-constitutional basis whenever possible. 138 The Court of Appeals rejected the state's argument that the
court order violated the eleventh amendment by being based solely
on state law. 139 Based on considerations of comity, the court also
134

1 would include in this category Nixon's fall, Johnson's end of the Vietnam War

paralysis, and Ford's and Carter's failures to be reelected.
135 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
136 Id. at 92.
137 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 661 (3d Cir. 1982).
1-38 Id. at 658; see Pennhurst,465 U.S. at 95-96; see also Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.
R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) ("Where a case in this court can be decided without refer-

ence to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued
and is not departed from without important reasons.").
139 Pennhurst, 673 F.2d at 659.
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declined to abstain from acting.140 Pennsylvania appealed the Court
of Appeals order as to the eleventh amendment and comity issues.
The Supreme Court found that the eleventh amendment had been
violated and reversed the Court of Appeals.
A.

The Eleventh Amendment Issue

The history of the eleventh amendment in the federal courts is
long and intricate. Congress passed the amendment to prevent prospectively the result reached in Chisolm v. Georgia.'4 ' In that case
out-of-state plaintiffs were allowed to sue Georgia in federal court
even though the doctrine of sovereign immunity apparently barred
the same action in state court. 14 2 The curiously indirect wording of
the eleventh amendment 43 has been held in a long line of cases to
"exemplify" the notion that the jurisdictional grant in article III was
not intended to eliminate the defense of state sovereign immunity in
federal court proceedings.' 4 4 Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana145 the Court
held that a federal court action by a citizen against his own state
might also be abated on the ground of the sovereign's immunity.' 4 6
The operation of a state's sovereign immunity in a federal proceeding involving federal claims has been an issue in numerous
cases. The Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity is no
bar to an action by the United States against a state.' 4 7 Very little
else is clear.
In Ex parte Young 148 the Court decided that sovereign immunity
did not bar a federal court from prospectively enjoining a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional state statute. The Court
barred Minnesota's attorney general from enforcing a state railroad
rate regulation which unconstitutionally took the plaintiff's property
by imposing unfair rates. Minnesota's doctrine of sovereign immunity barred any state court challenge of these rates. Justice Peckham
wrote:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it
be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitu140

Id. at 659-60.

141

2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793); see Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 97-98.
2 U.S. (2 Dali.) at 479-80.

142

143 "TheJudicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT.
amend. XI.
144 E.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 98-99.
145
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
146
Id at 20-21.
147
See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892) (state consents to suit by
United States upon entry into Union).
148
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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tional act to the injury of the complainants is a proceeding without
the authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon
the part of a state official ....

[H]e is in that case stripped of his
149

official or representative character ....

Exparte Young must be interpreted cautiously in light of the circumstances under which it arose. It is one of a series of decisions in
which the federal courts imposed limits on aggressive state regulation of large business enterprises, especially railroads.' 50 Thus, the
Court's willingness to disregard federalism should be discounted to
some extent. At the same time, if sovereign immunity could bar federal and, of course, state litigation of federal claims, then the Constitution's supremacy principle would be rendered meaningless.
Thus, a more theoretically sound decision in Ex parte Young would
have held that a state is not sovereignly immune to federal constitutional claims even in its own courts.
Exparte Young's fiction-that an erring state officer was stripped
of his or her official character-eliminated the problem of sovereign
immunity in cases involving federal constitutional claims when only
prospective, injunctive relief is sought. Post-Exparte Young decisions
have replaced this fiction to some extent with a test balancing the
justification for sovereign immunity against the importance of the
particular federal right asserted. In Edelman v. Jordan,15 the leading
recent case, Justice Rehnquist held that sovereign immunity barred
a suit seeking retroactive payments of welfare benefits which went
unpaid in violation of federal law. Because a retroactive award
would necessarily come from the state's general coffers, a significant
state interest existed.' 52 Justice Rehnquist concluded, "As in most
areas of the law, the difference between the type of relief barred by
149
Id. at 159-60. Justice Peckham also wrote the majority opinion in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state statute limiting hours of labor held unconstitutional). Both cases struck down state attempts to regulate commerce as
unconstitutional.
150 See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (Nebraska statute fixing reasonable maximum railway rates deprived companies of just compensation); Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) (Minnesota statute establishing commission to regulate railroad rates held unconstitutional because it deprived railroads of
property without due process of law and of equal protection of the laws). The Supreme
Court approved and enforced, however, similar federal regulatory programs. See text
accompanying supra note 132; see also Cook, History of Rate-Determination Under the Due
Process Clauses, 11 U. CHi. L. REV. 297 (1944).
151 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Rehnquist, writing again for the majority after Edelman,
concluded that the eleventh amendment does not bar suits in federal court premised on
causes of action created by Congress pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see also Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
152
Retroactive payment in this case "resembles far more closely [a] monetary award

576

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:553

the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young
53
will not, in many instances, be that between day and night."'
B.

The Pennhurst Decisions

With the post-eleventh amendment cases as their primary reference point, the Pennhurst justices considered the Pennhurst residents' claims. Justice Stevens, in a biting dissent, 54 bitterly
disagreed with Justice Powell's majority opinion about the correct
characterization of the cases that followed Ex parte Young. Even Justice Stevens, however, did not argue that the Supreme Court had
fully and forthrightly decided the issue of whether a state official's
violation of state law also strips away sovereign immunity. 155 However, Justice Stevens did claim that this stripping had in fact oc56
curred in some cases.1
Thus, Pennhurst presented a somewhat novel question. Justice
Powell argued that to deprive a state of sovereign immunity when it
violated its own law would be to "emasculate the Eleventh Amendment."1 57 Justice Stevens seemed to suggest that this emasculation
had already occurred.1 58 Perhaps behind Justice Stevens's venom
lay his apprehensions about potential problem cases arising from
the majority's decision.
The majority concluded that sovereign immunity barred the
Pennhurst school remedial order and remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals for a reconsideration of the federal issues.' 59 This
disposition may cause administrative problems in pendent jurisdictional proceedings in which some, but not all, claims are subject to a
defense of sovereign immunity. Justice Powell noted in response to
this possibility that pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made convenagainst the state itself than it does prospective injunctive relief." Edelnian, 415 U.S. at
665 (citation omitted).
153 Id. at 667.
154 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Although part II ofJustice Stevens' opinion is quite emphatic, a careful reading
of his description of case holdings suggests that I am correct. Id. at 130-39.
156 Id. at 132-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 106 (majority opinion).
158 Id. at 130-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 124-25 (majority opinion). This decision came at the end of a long series of
decisions, including prior review by the Supreme Court itself. In its first consideration
of the case the Court held that section 111 of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982), did not create any substantive rights.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1981). The Court
then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of remaining state
law, and federal constitutional and statutory issues. Id. at 31. The Court did not in its
first decision consider whether a decision premised solely on state law would violate the
eleventh amendment.
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ience without an explicit basis in article 111160 and that in many cases
parallel proceedings in state and federal courts already take
61
place.'
Pennhurstwill affect only those cases in which a sovereign immunity defense is available, including cases in which a plaintiff seeks
non-prospective injunctive relief or damages. Thus, if the state has
consented, waived, or abolished its immunity, no eleventh amendment problem will arise with a decree like the one the Court of Appeals entered. Nevertheless, the decision will impose costs in future
litigation because a state's sovereign immunity status must be ascertained at an early point in such pendent proceedings or multiple
1 62
proceedings may be required in some situations.
C.

Sovereign Immunity Doctrine

Reasonable and intelligent justices obviously disagreed about
the meaning of the doctrine and precedent confronting them in Pennhurst. Justice Stevens stated that the fiction of stripping extended
to violations of state law. 163 Justice Brennan in a separate dissent
argued that the eleventh amendment does not apply to a case between a state and its own citizens and called for the overruling of
Hans v. Louisiana.1 6 4 Justice Powell implies that assuming that federal jurisdiction exists, the eleventh amendment precludes action in
a federal court if state law is in question and there has been no
waiver.' 65 If federal rights are violated, then Edelman's balancing
seems to be in order.
One could argue that the federal courts in Pennhurst should
have abstained from passing on the state law issue: the Court of Appeals decided a significant question of Pennsylvania law on which
the federal courts needed additional state law guidance. 16 6 The
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 120.
Id. at 122.
In addition, there remains the difficult question of whether the remedy sought is
for "past" as opposed to "continuing" violations of federal law. See, e.g., Papasan v.
Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 2942 (1986) ("We discern no substantive difference between a
not-yet-extinguished liability for a past breach of trust and the continuing obligation to
meet trust responsibilities asserted by the petitioners.").
163
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 158.
164
Id. at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, in a later decision, embraced
the substance ofJustice Brennan's dissent. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("Additional study has made it abundantly
clear that not only Edelman, but Hans v. Louisiana as well, can properly be characterized
as 'egregiously incorrect.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
165
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, 121.
166 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had decided in In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 96,
429 A.2d 631, 636 (1981) that the state statute required the state to adopt the "least
restrictive environment" approach to the care of retarded persons.
160
161
162
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Court of Appeals might have avoided a decision premised on state
law or declined to rule for reasons of comity. On the other hand,
given the current judicial distaste for abstention, the Pennsylvania
courts provided sufficient guidance to render use of that device
unjustified. 167
Because of the unlikelihood of abstention, Pennhurst should be
evaluated in terms of eleventh amendment doctrine. Pennhurst is a
case with more basis for doctrinal certitude than Bowsher or Chadha
because, as Justice Powell argued, it presents starkly the question of
whether the eleventh amendment has any content. Even though the
long line of precedent suggests that the eleventh amendment's content can be balanced away, nothing in the amendment's text or
background justifies the adoption of the stripping fiction.
Stripping was generated by a result-oriented jurisprudence
which assumes that controversies must be resolvable, yet the framers may have contemplated that certain controversies in which a
state is a party would not be resolvable by judicial process. 6 8 In any
event, it is impossible to derive from article III's general grant of
federal jurisdiction a specific direction to enforce federal rights
against the states. 69 Even the Court, in Edelman and elsewhere, has
167
The classic case of discretionary abstention is Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (remanding case to state court for definitive construction
of state statute alleged to discriminate against black porters by requiring white conductors to attend sleeping cars in to avoid "needless friction" with state policies). But in
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), where an anti-communist state oath law was
challenged under the first amendment, the Supreme Court held that abstention is not
proper where a statute is unconstitutional on its face. In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), the Court laid out the various bases
for abstention. Id. at 813-17. It found that none of them applied in that case but dismissed the action on the "separate" ground that to do so comported with "wise judicial
administration" in view of contemporaneous state court proceedings. Id. at 817.
Strident anti-abstention commentary can be found in Redish, Abstention, Separationof
Powers, and the Limits of theJudicialFunction, 94 YALE LJ. 71 (1984) and Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463
(1978). For a more balanced view, see Field, Abstention in ConstitutionalCases: The Scope of
the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
The abstention doctrine may be reviving. In the most recent Term a unanimous
Supreme Court reversed a Sixth Circuit decision which halted a pending state administrative civil rights proceeding on the ground that it infringed religious freedom. Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2718 (1986). The
Court reinstated a district court order abstaining under the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), from intervening in that proceeding. Dayton ChristianSchools, 106
S. Ct. at 2720.
168
It is certainly clear that the Framers did not give the scope ofjudicial power and
authority systematic attention. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTrrTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 154 (1913).
169
Herbert Wechsler finds such a direction implicit in the supremacy clause.
Wechsler, supra note 2, at 3. But that clause omits any mention of federal judges and, at
the least, implies that state court judges will normally be the first line of defense in
ensuring that the supremacy principle is observed. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, cl. 2. Wechsler
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found its earlier decision in Ex parte Young hard to explain if one
believes that the eleventh amendment has content.
D.

The Expressive and Historical Element

Pennhurst has, to employ Bobbitt's formulation, an expressive
element: it reminds the courts of the existence of the federal system
and highlights the states' continuing power to assert or to waive
their historical immunity. 170 But Pennhurst cannot be formulated
into neatly expressed principles of lasting linguistic value.
One can say more about Pennhurst. Like the themes in Bowsher
and other cases involving structural constitutional issues which cannot successfully be enshrined by language, the issues and results in
Pennhurstare particularly susceptible to historical rearrangement by
and in response to the changing demands of the social order. While
our political system formally remains federal in structure, there has
been a sustained augmentation of the power and responsibility of
the national government. Frequently national power has been enhanced with the specific goal of overwhelming state resistance, even
in areas of traditional state responsibility such as crime, health, and
safety. It would be curious to find that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity could long resist that trend. And once that doctrine was
breached by ajudicial fiction, as it was in Exparte Young and its progeny, it is hard to stop the process of contraction.
Yet Pennhurst represents some degree of hedging on the trend
of federal domination of the states. As discussed in the next section,
Garcia seems inconsistently to indicate that the courts will never
limit the direct exercise of a federal power, in that case the commerce power, by reference to state sovereignty. This result is in line
with historical developments in American society and government
since 1860. These two tendencies may be reconciled if one understands that while Pennhurst suggests that although the federal courts
will, as a result of historical developments, decline to limit a direct
exercise of an enumerated federal power, they may recognize (and
perhaps even enhance) state sovereignty in other situations. Thus,
one might predict a revival of abstention. 17 1 One other possible explanation is that Pennhurst merely reflects the docket-clearing priorities of the recently retired Chief Justice.
To the extent that Pennhurst reflects either residual deference to
the states or fear of the alleged problem of overloaded federal court
suggests that state court judges are mentioned primarily to remind them of the principie. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 3.
170 Justice Powell discusses the fact that a state may consent to be sued only in a
particular forum, which is not necessarily a federal court. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 n.9.
171
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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dockets, it closely resembles Stone v. Powell,' 7 2 decided in 1976. In
Stone the Court limited federal habeas corpus consideration of
search and seizure claims originating in state proceedings. The
Court held that federal habeas corpus review of such claims is appropriate only if a petitioner was denied "full and fair litigation" of
73
such claims by the state.'
To say that Pennhurst resembles Stone is, of course, only a partial
explanation, particularly when Pennhurst is compared with Garcia.
An historical explanation for developments in constitutional law
presupposes that the explanation for a particular result can be
found only in continuing or changing social perceptions of the questions involved. Pennhurst, like Bowsher, reflects a continuing social
fear of concentrations of power.
III
GARCIA

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 174 apparently
halts for the present the Supreme Court's search for affirmative limits on Congress's commerce power arising from state sovereignty.
The search began in National League of Cities v. Usery, t 75 when the
Court invalidated some amendments to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act' 76 which applied federal wage and hour rules to municipal
fire and police workers. In the nine years that followed the Court
considered five major commerce clause cases. According to the majority in Garcia, the Court in those cases was unable to articulate a
workable standard for determining tangible limits under the commerce power on federal action affecting state governmental powers.
A.

Federalism and the Commerce Clause

Garcia represents the most visible, recent example of collective
doctrinal uncertainty within the Court. 177 In Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association 178 the Court attempted mid-way
through the post-Usery cases to promulgate a four-pronged test. To
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Id. at 482. AlthoughJustice Powell's opinion for the majority is largely confined
to a discussion of the role of and justification for the exclusionary rule, Justice Brennan
in dissent wrote that these cases "involve the question of the availability of afederalforum
for vindicating those federally guaranteed rights." Id. at 503.
174 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
175 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
176
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(1974).
177
The fourth amendment is less of an example of collective uncertainty because
some of the justices have fairly precise doctrinal views on the issue. See, e.g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
178 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
172
173
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offend state sovereignty, a challenged federal regulation first had to
regulate the state as a state. 179 Second, the regulation had to "address" matters that were indispensable attributes of state sovereignty.' 80 Third, state compliance with the regulation had to impair
directly the state's ability "to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions."' 18 1 Fourth, in relation to the
state interest, "the nature of the federal interest advanced ...[could
1 82
not] justif[y] state submission."'
In GarciaJustice Blackmun for the majority referred to the Hodel
test and the Court's unsuccessful efforts to apply it: he wrote, "What
has proved problematic is not the perception that the Constitution's
federal structure imposes limitations on the Commerce Clause, but
rather the nature and content of those limitations."' 18 3 Blackmun
went on to hold that the primary limitation on the exercise of the
commerce power is the structure of the legislative branch. Thus,
states will have to trust Congress to protect their interests in the
formulation of legislation. 18 4 Although Blackmun did not completely abandon the idea of affirmative limitations on the commerce
power, he did hold that the application of the federal wage and hour
legislation to a mass transit system did not violate whatever limitation might exist. Thus, he concluded by quoting the late Justice Felix Frankfurter's statement that there may well be some "horribles"
which would produce a decision along the lines of the factually over18 5
ruled Usery.
Usery itself had overruled a fairly recent decision.' 8 6 In the
course of Usery's short but active life, the Court substantially diluted
its impact. For example, it sustained in Hodel an aggressive federal
program which overrode historically entrenched state power over
land use in the interest of controlling coal strip-mining.' 8 7 In Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi,188 the Court upheld a federal program designed to channel state licensing of power plants.
And in the term before Garcia, the Court sustained the application of
federal age discrimination rules to game wardens employed by the
state of Wyoming. 18 9
Id. at 287.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 288 (quoting NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
Id. at 288 n.29.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 556.
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
187 452 U.S. at 288 (district court decision that federal program violated tenth
amendment "rests on an unwarranted extension of ...NationalLeague of Cities").
188
456 U.S. 742 (1982).
189
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
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Like Pennhurst, Garcia produced several well-argued dissents.
Justice O'Connor suggested that while no "bright line" 19 0 rule is
possible in a case like Usery, "state autonomy" should still count as a
"factor in the balance when interpreting the means by which Congress can exercise its authority on the States as States."' 19 1 Justice
Powell's dissent favored a balancing approach like the fourth prong
of the Hodel test, in which the relative strengths of the federal and
92
state interests are compared.'
B.

The Garcia Decision

There are several possible ways to view Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Garcia. He may have meant that although state sovereignty imposes affirmative limitations on the exercise of the commerce power, the Court is unable to articulate them. Another view,
no doubt supported by some of those who joined in the majority, is
that there is no limitation on the exercise of the commerce power
93
other than the federal political process.'
Most commentators, especially doctrinalists, would reject the
possibility of an inarticulable standard. Such a possibility calls to
mind the late Justice Potter Stewart's claim that he could not define
obscenity, but he could identify it. 194 Yet, it may not be absurd to
state that the commerce power has limits for which it is difficult,
perhaps impossible, to articulate an enduring standard. The nature
of what is integral to a government has changed drastically since
1789 and will continue to change. Just as the Court had difficulty
distinguishing between an "integral" transit system and a
"nonintegral" intercity railway system, 19 5 so it will have difficulty
specifying what functions are so central or integral to a state government that they define its sovereignty. And once the Court has made
such a categorization, time will ultimately strain some of its
specifications.
The positions ofJustices Powell, O'Connor, and Blackmun may
be presented in a form recognizable as "doctrine," but in each case
the doctrine's core is so spongy as to make the doctrinal formulation
worth very little. For example, Justice O'Connor's state autonomy
factor's weight would vary tremendously depending on a court's estimation of the federal interest's importance. Such a factor would
regularly lose out with a court dominated by people like Justice Mar190
191
192
193
occur
194
195

Garcia, 469 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 578 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, promised a revival of Use y, presumably to
once the balance of power on the Court shifts again. Id. at 579-80.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring.)
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
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shall, but would win often if the court were dominated by people
like Justice O'Connor. Justice Powell's balancing test leads in exactly the same direction. By contrast, Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion promises somewhat greater repose than would the
O'Connor or Powell resolution.
C.

The Expressive Element

Like Usery, Garcia has an expressive aspect. Usery stood for the
proposition that there are some limits to the commerce power inherent in the federal system; more generally, it emphasized that the
states and their instrumentalities count. Garcia's message is, at its
least coherent level, that courts should not bother with federalism
questions if Congress has designed an intricate regulatory statute
for some reason apart from federalism. Despite these expressive elements, neither Usery nor Garcia lends itself to an enduring doctrinal
formulation. Revealingly, even the more conservative dissenters in
Garcia were unable to formulate with any precision a standard for
the future.
D.

An Historical Approach

The significance of Garcia, like that of Bowsher and Pennhurst, is
primarily historical. As American society has grown and centralized,
the national government has faced increasing demands for solutions
to problems. In response, the Court has gradually demolished most
possible limits on the commerce power. The Court defined the
word "regulate" broadly.196 It dropped the nineteenth-century distinctions between navigation, commerce, manufacturing, mining,
and production-of which the last three were originally perceived as
not commerce.' 9 7 The Court further broadened the commerce
power by holding that Congress could undertake commerce regulation for any end not contradicted by an affirmative textual constitutional provision other than the ninth and tenth amendments.' 9 8
196 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) (upholding federal
coastal licenses to operate in New York waters and striking down New York laws which
created steamboat monopoly).
197 Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)
("Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is
essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.") with Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) ("[N]one of [the] essential antecedents of production
constitutes a transaction in or forms any part of interstate commerce" and is therefore
not subject to federal regulation.).
198
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (confirming Congress's power to regulate against racial discrimination where Congress found such discrimination has "a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce").
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Thus, Congress could ban lottery tickets because they were morally
reprehensible, not because they damaged or impeded some economic interest. 199 Finally, the Court held that federal regulation of
commerce could extend to things or actions not themselves in commerce, but which might, when aggregated with the things or actions
of others similarly situated, "affect" commerce. 20 0 As social pressure has mounted, the Court has poured into the commerce clause a
jurisprudence which reflects a fundamental alteration in the Constitution's allocation of governmental powers.
However, the holding of Pennhurst indicates that Garcia does not
amount to the complete interment of states' authority. Courts still
might, and in the former case the Supreme Court did, recognize the
substantiality of the states' interest in handling nonfederal legal
questions not involving direct exercises of an enumerated federal
power. This possibility might seem insignificant when compared
with both the frequency and significance of Congress's use of the
commerce power, but developments in other areas of federalism indicate that it is not.
In recent cases the Court has reaffirmed its desire to avoid invalidating state law under the supremacy clause, even when a state
and the federal government both exercise their respective powers to
regulate essentially the same thing. For instance, in a tortured opinion Justice White upheld a California moratorium on building nuclear power plants 20 ' in the face of elaborate federal statutory and
administrative regulation of that industry. The Court has also declined to strike down state laws which burden interstate commerce
so long as they serve a "legitimate" local purpose. 20 2 At the same
199

Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
("[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to
regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the states of origin
and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce
....
Congress may... prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, however 'local' their operations may appear."); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942) ("That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by
itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here,
his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial.").
201
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); see also Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (Washington law regulating oil tankers
partially validated, partially invalidated). But see Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v.
State Oil & Gas Bd., 106 S. Ct. 709 (1986) (Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board's authority pre-empted by federal regulation.).
202 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986) (upholding state restriction on
imports of bait fish). The Court described the applicable standard as whether a state
"needlessly obstruct[s] interstate trade or attempt[s] to 'place itself in a position of economic isolation.'" Id. at 2455 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527
200

(1935)).
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time that the Court has avoided finding federal-state collisions, it
20 3
has invalidated state laws discriminating against nonresidents.
Such decisions are not inconsistent with a limited recognition of
federalism, for they involve a question of the power of the states
among themselves and entail no exertion of national governmental
power.
Thus, Garcia more clearly than Bowsher or Pennhurst shows the
social order imposing its will on the legal system. I have suggested
that a generalized, historical, and strongly ingrained fear of concentrations of power supported questionable interpretations of the general notion of separation of powers in Bowsher and of the eleventh
amendment in Pennhurst,yet the Garcia Court subordinated that fear
in sustaining an exercise of the most powerful legal tool, a federal
enumerated power.
IV
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF AN
HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION

A.

The Meaning of an Historical Constitution

The Supreme Court failed to articulate meaningful doctrinal
formulations of enduring significance in Bowsher, Pennhurst,and Garica. This failure is not the result of judicial inadequacy or some
other temporary circumstance, nor does it lend support to claims
that law is radically or even significantly indeterminate at all times.
Rather, these cases demonstrate that the development of case law
arising under the United States Constitution can only be understood in its historical context.
To conclude that the United States Constitution and the legal
rules it creates are an historical constitution is not novel 20 4 and may
not appear to have much content. The idea certainly does not, in
the abstract, offer much specific guidance about what the future
holds. And it suggests that past results will frequently be explained
in terms of their non-legal contexts, which are subject to perpetual
revisions, rearrangements, and changes in historical fashion.
There are, of course, various forms or types of historical analy203
See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (state statute
taxing out-of-state insurance companies at higher rate held invalid); United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (municipal ordinance

limiting employment subject to the privileges and immunities clause). The Court has
continued to apply vigorously explicit federal statutory preemptions of state law, as in
the case of the federal pension law. See, e.g., Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp.,
463 U.S. 1220 (1983), aff'g mer., Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F. 2d 323,
329 (2d Cir. 1982) (state statute relating to employee benefit plan as defined by ERISA
preempted by federal statute).
204
See generally C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1937).
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Some definition of the phrase "historical constitution" is
therefore necessary. By the term "historical constitution" I do not
mean that the original intention or understanding of a particular
provision in the Constitution ought necessarily (or even usually) to
control in constitutional law: indeed, I mean something almost the
20 6
opposite.
The historical theory of the Constitution places the evolution of
the Constitution in the context of the development of American society 20 7 and in a larger framework of social theory. The Constitution of 1787 established the fundamental, governmental structures
of a group of societies that wished to form a nation. It established a
national governmental structure and specified certain rights, powers, and obligations of the states and of the federal government and
its components and citizens.
The Constitution of 1787 is now a small element of what has
become a very large national community with a number of significant regional subcommunities. This national community functions
primarily in response to the will of its constituency and certain external stimuli, 208 and not in response to abstract constitutional or
other legal commands.
Our society continues to be dynamic, but this dynamism is
neither new nor materially more frenetic than it was, for example,
from 1830-1870. Some periods may experience greater change or
stability than others, but close historical study of even the most serene epochs reveals change and tension as well as continuity and
sis.2

5

consensus.

20 9

205
Examples are Marxist history, intellectual history, and history which focuses on
great men.
206
See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985) (arguing that the Framers did not intend "the original understanding at Philadelphia" to be dispositive of constitutional inquiries.).
207
I would even go so far as to endorse an expanded version of the thesis offered
here to the effect that in the United States the interpretation and operation of most
indigenous legal subsystems replicates a substance-oriented, common-law system even if
the core of the subsystem is a statute or a constitution. (I think this observation is less
likely to be true of highly volatile statutes like the Internal Revenue Code than, for example, the U.C.C.) In such common law systems I believe that the crucial historical fact
has been the freedom, rather than the constraint, imposed by the operation of precedential "doctrine." Precedent may actually liberatejudges by focusing not on issues of legal
formality but rather on the limits and continuing vitality of a non-canonical rule. See
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). For an interesting comparative treatment of aspects of this question, see P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY,
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987).
208
Much has been written about the accuracy of various ideological and philosophic

perspectives in both the interpretation and use of history. In this essay I have attempted
to avoid this debate, although my views on this issue are fairly obvious.
209 See, e.g., Dyer, Changes in the Link Between FamiliesandLand in the 1Vest Midlands in the

1987]

THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION

587

The relative insignificance of the Constitution and the fact of
perpetual change in the underlying social order constantly generates new questions, new aspirations, new conflicts, and new interpretations of old institutions and old language. Many of these
developments arise directly or obliquely from consideration of constitutional issues.
The fact that change is pervasive both in society and in the substance of its law does not necessarily mean that the constitutional
text will be completely or substantially disregarded in the course of
history. One value which a society may embrace is a reverence for
the constitutional text. But even with such a commitment, constitutions frequently employ language, phrases like "cruel and unusual"
punishment 2 10 and "due process of law, 2 1 ' which not only do not
inhibit but invite constant societal reevaluation. More significantly,
language frequently lacks the precision to hold off over time insistent social demands, even assuming a commitment to the constitutional canon.
In the end, however, constitutions and law cannot long constrain societies. Rather, each society has considerable freedom in its
internal, dynamic, historical evolution to redefine basic parts of its
constitution. This is particularly true if, as just suggested, the text
uses open-ended phrases or concepts, omits specification of implied
provisions, or employs very general and grandiose formulations.
Thus, instability and change have been noteworthy elements in the
legal development of the unspecified powers of the states2 1 2 and
now the general rubrics enjoining separation of governmental
functions.
Some 2 13 will decry this uncertainty or instability in the core
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, in
1984).
210

LAND, KINSHIP, AND LIFE-CYcLE

305 (R. Smith ed.

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

211 Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to terminate pregnancy within
right to privacy) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (broadly defining due process liberty interests to include right to exercise discretion about one's children's education, thus constraining states' regulation of such family matters) and Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (bringing right to contract freely within scope of liberty interest, thus constraining states' passage of labor legislation) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 106
S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (homosexuals' right to engage in sodomy not fundamental) and Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (optician's right to do business does not
prevent broadly restrictive regulation of opticians).
212 Compare Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (Nebraska's
regulation of interstate ground water use violative of commerce clause) with Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (California's regulation of
nuclear power plants not pre-empted by Atomic Energy Act and thus not a violation of
due process clause).
213 Herbert Wechsler, for example, obviously disapproves of this kind of approach.
Other commentators have endorsed a theory of constitutional interpretation which I
would call a common-law type theory that is not markedly different from the theory of an
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meanings of basic provisions of the Constitution. They misconstrue
the availability of alternatives: any constitution or interpretation of a
constitution which attempts to confine the greater part of such a
document or set of ideas about the structure of government will fail
as soon as the underlying social order moves, in its own ways, to
reject its confines.
B. Judicial Decisions Under an Historical Constitution Theory
While acknowledging that the Constitution ought to be viewed
primarily as an historical document, many will wonder what significance that conclusion should have for judges and for others concerned with particular cases. It is easier to state what judges should
not do than to specify exactly how they should proceed. Generally,
judges who understand the historical character of the Constitution
should not attempt to confine their study of particular provisions to
ascertaining what was originally intended or how it operated at a
particular time.
More specifically, the notion of an historical constitution suggests the following guidelines. First, judges who accept the Constitution as primarily an historically contingent source of law should
recognize the legitimacy and inevitability of alterations in former
constitutional certainties. Thus, precedent,2 1 4 especially when it involves general constitutional prescriptions, should not be understood as firm doctrine, but as an expression of law in one context.2 1 5
While precedent should not lightly be tossed away, its continuing
persuasiveness hinges on its larger, historical context. Thus, in Bowsher both courts properly minimized the underpinnings of the
Humphrey's Executor decision. 2 16 Conversely, the very stringent
framework erected in Korematsu v. United States2 1 7 to evaluate suspect
racial classifications seems particularly reliable. Korematsu confronted a powerful social demand for a decision that would minimize the importance of the claims of American citizens ofJapanese
ancestry.
Second, the American judicial system's unique contribution to
jurisprudence has been to encourage judges to decide cases having
a substantial "political" component or presenting difficult fundamental questions. While judges should occasionally employ pruhistorical constitution. See, e.g., Wellington, Book Review, 97 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1983)
(reviewing M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982)).
214
See supra note 207.
215
The district court recognized this to some extent in Synar. See 626 F. Supp. at
1384 (discussing decline of the delegation doctrine which accompanied rise of administrative law).
216
Id. at 1399; Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3188.
217
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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dential devices to avoid a decision,2 18 the American judicial system
should continue to decide a broad range of political and "fundamental" cases. In deciding such cases judges should focus on the
democratic nature of American government and law and on the societal values at issue. In general, judicial resolution of questions
should foster further societal development with respect to the concerns in dispute. Decisions like Lochner v. New York

21 9

and Roe v.

Wade2 20

(discussed below) are, in the absence of a social consen2
2
sus, ' mistaken, whereas decisions imposing or specifying procedural mechanisms to ensure fair legislative or judicial consideration
2 22
of issues are valid.
Third, judges may decide cases which involve consideration of
deeply ingrained social attitudes or prejudices. We accept the result
in Brown v. Board of Education2 23 not because there was a social consensus in favor of integration, but because there was a consensus,
and long judicial preparation, 2 24 supporting the conclusion that sep218
For example, Indiana's pro-Republican party legislative gerrymandering which
did not disable any identifiable group needing protection under the equal protection
clause presents a political question in two senses. See Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct.
2797 (1986).
219
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
220
410 U.S. 113 (1973); see infra text accompanying notes 250-53.
221
When one suggests that legal rules are determined at least to some extent by a
nonformal process of social consensus, people immediately think that one is arguing
that law is or should be determined by a Gallup poll or some other simple-minded and
evanescent indication of majoritarian sentiment. This critical and pejoritive picture is
based on several incorrect assumptions. First, a society's polity need not be majoritarian
at all. Second, the results of some instant measurement of sentiment are, even if accurate, rarely transferable and should be resisted by judges considering appropriate legal
rules. Third, the legislative process is designed to handle most social demands and an
historically sensitive judge will look to it to resolve most social questions.
222
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (mandating procedure to ensure
defendant is not deprived of fifth amendment right against self-incrimination). I am
aware that many, including perhaps some current justices of the Supreme Court (e.g.,
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.) (recognizing narrow
"public" safety exception to Miranda); Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1142 (1986)
(O'Connor, J.) (individual held in custody and given Miranda warning need not be informed of an outside telephone call relating that attorney had been hired)) and some
who have read versions of this article, find it difficult to distinguish Miranda's elaborate,
quasi-legislative specification of procedures to be applied to individuals held in custody
from the similarly elaborate and quasi-legislative specifications of privacy rights in Roe's
pregnancy situation. It is argued that the Constitution provides little or no basis for
either.
I would agree that no consensus supports the particular format of procedures established by Miranda,but I believe that that decision is much more easily sustained by most
theories of the role of the text and also by a wide-ranging social consensus supporting
the desirability of protecting individuals in police custody but not yet charged with a
crime.
223
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
224
See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (requirement of
segregated seats in a mixed race law school held to violate equal protection clause);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (separate law school for blacks in Texas held not
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arate schools were unfair. There is still no consensus, however,
about how to remedy the multiple problems of deprivations which
blacks have experienced: the deeply divergent economic and, in certain cases, cultural situations of blacks and others hinders such a
consensus. 2 25 Not surprisingly, there is also no social consensus
supporting aggressive affirmative action programs. The courts have,
in effect, recognized this vacuum: the mere occurrence of unequal
results in employment or other facets of life does not automatically
trigger the requirement of remedial action, 2 26 but the development
and implementation of an affirmative action program in such a case
pursuant to civil rights legislation 22 7 or private agreement 2 28 is not
prohibited.
Fourth, courts generally should avoid hasty decision of important cases. The expedited appeal procedure in cases in which a federal statute has been held unconstitutional 2 29 has considerable
to be equal to white law school; black student ordered admitted under equal protection
clause); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constitutes state action which violates equal protection clause);
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (black woman cannot be deprived of
legal education available to equally qualified whites); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938) (failure to provide any instate legal education for blacks violates
equal protection clause when it is available to whites); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917) (city ordinance prohibiting mixed-race blocks violative of due process); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (exclusion of nonwhites from grand jury venire
panels violates equal protection clause).
225
Thus, I think that the federal courts should avoid elaborate remedial specifications in decrees in cases of racial discrimination. Rather, they should employ simple,
but drastic, remedies like ordering the schools closed until the parties can reach a settlement about a remedial order. This might mean that residential segregation would not be
immediately remedied by busing orders because black litigants might accept resource
reallocations to predominantly black neighborhood schools. In hindsight, this remedy
might have been more efficacious than busing orders. In such cases it is also possible
that no settlement can ever be devised among the parties.
The reliance on busing and other strategies designed to produce a quick balance of
the available races in all schools may have led to Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974), which essentially leaves blacks remediless if the segregated schools exist across
municipal boundaries not drawn in a racially discriminatory manner. If local agreement
had created the primary remedies, then the Milliken plaintiffs might have won their case
with the State of Michigan and have negotiated special state remedial assistance for the
Detroit school system.
226
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (police test with disproportionate
racial impact not unconstitutional because test is directly related to job requirements).
227
See Local 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.
Ct. 3063 (1986) (consent decree may be entered to benefit minority firefighters who
were not actual victims of employer's discrimination); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) (fund order and membership
goal designed to benefit minority sheet metal workers constitutional although it would
benefit some minorities not directly harmed).
228
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (master collective
bargaining agreement with affirmative action plan allowing preferential treatment of minority trainees not prohibited by Civil Rights Act).
229
28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982).
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appeal. It promises a speedy resolution of an important matter
which, if delayed, might create serious problems in operating or in
disentangling the operation of the government. But speed should
be sacrificed when it imposes significant costs through poor results.
While the district court produced a solid opinion in Synar, the members of the Supreme Court should have taken more time to observe
the reaction to that decision and to review its reasoning carefully
before rushing to a conclusion. Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Bowsher, like his opinion in the expedited case of United States v.
Nixon, 230 reflects hasty, superficial thinking and composition.
Fifth, a prerequisite to judicial behavior consistent with an historical conception of the Constitution is careful rehearsal of the
background of each case and of its most relevant precedents.
Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court decision reflects
an appreciation of the implications of their attempts to draw a line
based on separation of powers in the sand of governmental practice.
If Congress cannot participate in the removal of a purportedly executive official, then it is hard to explain why Congress may legislate
sweeping limitations on the President's power to remove such an
official. Similarly, if independent agencies perform legislative or
quasi-legislative functions and executive branch officials perform
functions within the scope of the judicial power of the United States,
then one looks in vain to find a textual basis-or even a basis in
some partial separations-of-powers theory-to explain why a presumably legislative official may not perform certain executive
branch functions.
A judge who recognizes the historical nature of the Constitution will confront two major difficulties. First, general aspirational
values recognized in the Constitution (for instance, that people
should be treated equally) may in some cases conflict with an overwhelming social consensus favoring a specific social practice or rule
(for example, one which does not reflect equal treatment). Second,
the viewpoint of an enlightened or elite segment of the population
(for instance, that the death penalty is cruel) may diverge from a
broad social consensus (for example, that the death penalty may be
an appropriate sanction for heinous crimes). 23 ' Although these two
situations cannot be completely separated, I would argue that the
judge is not free in a democratic society to act solely on some view
of what an elite segment wishes, but he may and should act if, in
considering the general aspirational goal against the enduring social
practice, he thinks that the court's decision might move society to
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidating death penalties in
this case without a majority opinion).
230
231
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accept an expanded conception of equality or due process. Thus,
2 32
judges may lead society in some limited situations.
C.

An Historical Constitution and the Protection of Rights

An historical theory of the Constitution may be thought of as a
threat to the Constitution's role in erecting "rights" or other barriers to government action which protect the weak or the oppressed.
Some will no doubt fear that judges who accept such a theory of the
Constitution will be particularly prone to defer to the legislative will
or some other demand 23 3 of the social order that might hurt a minority group or a particular individual. It is not enough to respond
that a theory of "rights", even when held by judges who are doctrinalists, has not always protected unpopular minorities 2 34 or
2 35
individuals.
There are several responses to criticisms of the historical approach based on fears of discrimination against minorities or individuals. First, the social evolution which produces new substance in
constitutional relations also may produce new demands for protections, like the demands allegedly protected by static conceptions of
232
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (different standards for conferral of dependant status upon spouses of military women than spouses of military men in
minority violates due process); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (making right to vote in any manner contingent on wealth violates equal protection clause).
Some who have read this article have identified the assertion that judges may occasionally lead society as both fatal and contrary to the main thesis. I could hide behind a
claim that leading is frequently inadvertent. For instance, in many situations judges face
considerable uncertainty and very mixed demands from a society. In other situations,
judges confront very vocal demands from a small segment of society and have little evidence of a social consensus one way or another.
But I am admitting to more than the difficulty of ascertaining and following a consensus: I am suggesting that judges can occasionally push an ambivalent or reluctant
social order. I will have to save for another article a fuller articulation of this possibility,
but because the explanation offered is based on observation and is primarily descriptive,
it would be inaccurate for me not to admit that leading can take place and can be
successful.
233
The classic popular example of this is, of course, acute public pressure to indict,
convict, and execute people allegedly responsible for heinous crimes. But part of the
historical constitution is that judges should be aware of and resistant to sudden, emotional demands for a particular judicial or legal result. Although a theory of an historical
Constitution accepts the notion that a Constitution is ultimately an instrument of social,
popular will, there is frequently a major difference between what societies seem to demand in panicked circumstances and what they demand over time.
234
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (World War II internment
ofJapanese-Americans held constitutional).
235
See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding convictions for
sedition on grounds that circulars which advocated supporting Russian Revolution by
refusing to work in munitions factories necessarily interfered with war effort against
Germany); Polenberg, Progressivism and Anarchism:Judge Henry D. Clayton and the Abrams
Trial, 3 LAw & HIST. REv. 397 (1985).
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"rights." Therefore, doctrinalists should recognize that theories
which encourage legal rigidity may often discourage a widening of
constitutional protections.23 6 Just as "rights" doctrinalists point to
Brown v. Board of Education,23 7 they ignore Plessy v. Ferguson,23 8 Lochner v. New York, 23 9 and Bowers v. Hardwick.240 Doctrine, if articulable,
cannot be both rigidly protective and flexibly inclusive at the same
time.
Second, an historical view of the Constitution frequently does
result in the protection of "rights" claims asserted by minorities or
individuals. Read Robert Jackson's dissent in Korematsu v. United
States,24 1 the first Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,2 42 and
Felix Frankfurter's opinion in Rochin v. California.2 4 3 Eachjudge and
his opinion reflected a belief in the historical evolution of the protection of the individual from the exercise of government authority.
Ultimately, however, one must concede that an historical approach does defer in a democratic polity considerably to popular
will, particularly to a formal legislative expression of such will. The
conviction that a wide spectrum of people in a society should have
laws and rules that reflect their beliefs and actions forms the core of
an historical theory of constitutionalism if the particular society's
24 4
polity is democratic.
Jesse Choper has expressed a preference for judicial consideration of "rights" claims: Choper's work relies on the notion that
"rights" claims involve "principles" whereas governmental powers
cases involve only "allocations" of permissible powers.2 4 5 But powers impinge on claims for freedom or protection, and allocation de236 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing against expansion of due process property interests to include statutory entitlements); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969)
(BlackJ, dissenting) (arguing against extension of right to free speech to cover wearing
of political symbols at school); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
670 (1966) (BlackJ, dissenting) (arguing against striking down Virginia poll tax); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that fourth amendment alone does not bar admission of illegally seized evidence).
237
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
238
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana statute providing for racial separation

in railway cars).
239

198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding New York statute limiting total number of employee

working hours unconstitutional).
240
106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (refusing to strike down Georgia criminal law against
sodomy on privacy grounds).
241 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (JacksonJ., dissenting).
242 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
243 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
244 To admit that this is inevitable and proper is also a canon of doctrinalism. The
degree of openness with which new questions are faced or old ones reconsidered as a
result of social change is all that separates the two positions.
245 See sources cited supra note 23.
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cisions can significantly curtail or recognize such claims. For
example, on the surface, Dred Scott v. Sandford24 6 involved ajurisdictional question: whether a slave, or an alleged former slave, was a
citizen entitled to sue in federal court under article III. At a deeper
level, it involved a freedom claim: Dred Scott claimed that he was
24 7
free or that, in any event, he could sue to establish his freedom.
Finally, it involved a pure allocation of powers question: whether
Congress could prohibit or limit slavery in territories not yet organ248
ized as states.
An historical view of the Constitution does not distinguish a priori between individual claims for freedom and protection on the one
hand and allocations of power questions on the other. Indeed, the
history of constitutional development suggests that the two types of
questions are rarely distinct. Even when a case appears superficially
to be purely of one type, the future ramifications of a decision cannot be confined to one or the other realm. For instance, in the late
nineteenth century the Supreme Court decided a line of cases in
which the "rights" claims of resident Chinese aliens generally disappeared in resolving cases in favor of Congress's authority in exercising the naturalization power to abrogate treaties with the Chinese
24 9
Empire.
D.

An Historical Constitution and the Privacy Cases

Some might take the foregoing description of an historical approach to constitutional law to mean that a decision which reflects
the popular consensus is in and of itself valid. For example, some
might think I would say that Roe v. Wade2 50 is valid because the majority of Americans clearly support privacy in abortion matters; for
this reason Roe may never be completely overruled.
The Roe decision is not consistent with the theory of an historical constitution. The notion of an historical constitution rests upon
the theory that the social order continually defines the most fundamental aspects of the Constitution and of all law. One very important ingredient of that definition is society's power to condemn
certain actions based on moral values, even if those values are not
universally shared. I suspect that while the great majority of the
American people do not find abortion always immoral, many find it
immoral in some instances and believe that only individuals elected
by, and accountable to, the people should decide what is con246

60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

247

Id. at 403.

248
249

Id. at 432.
See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

250

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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demned. Thus, if Massachusetts wishes to ban abortion it should be
able to do so, except in the case of a clear threat to maternal life.
Conversely, if California wishes to allow abortion permissively it
should. An historical Constitution in a democratic society cannot allow judges to make basic moral judgments on fundamental issues
absent a clear consensus and some basis in the text supporting the
decision. Not surprisingly, then, dismay and doctrinal confusion
abound when the Supreme Court attempts to decide questions like
whether a state can impose a twenty-four hour waiting period before
251
an abortion may take place.
The theory of an historical constitution sees abortion as a question of deep social attitudes which, at least until an overwhelming
social consensus emerges, should be decided by state legislatures
rather than by a judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
that awards all rights to the fetus or to the prospective mother during the first trimester.
Roe or the dissent's position in Bowers v. Hardwick 252 could be
consistent with a theory of historical constitutionalism if they had
been decided on a basis other than the protection of abstract privacy
notions. If the Court had premised either Roe or Bowers on the fact
that enforcement of the abortion or sodomy prohibitions was either
nonexistent or so selective as to be freakish, 25 3 then state legislators
could have prevailed either by ensuring enforcement or by refraining from enacting them. Such a resolution of these cases would
have had the salutary effect of putting the pressure for a resolution
of such claims on the legislatures, where it appropriately resides.
E. Bowsher, Pennhurst, and Garcia Under an Historical
Constitution Theory
None of the three cases discussed here present fundamental
questions of social morality as clearly as does Roe. On the surface,
Bowsher, Pennhurst, and Garcia each involved a seemingly minute
question about the propriety of certain rules of intra- or inter-governmental behavior in a federal system with a tripartite national
government.
Garcia is probably the easiest case to reconcile with an historical
251
See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416
(1983). It is interesting, of course, to turn the abortion cases on their doctrinal heads
and ask whether a fetus should be considered a person and, if so, whether its rights are
protected. If a fetus is a person, then the logic of "rights" doctrinalism leaves the pregnant woman powerless.
252
106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
253
Although freakish enforcement has never led the Supreme Court to strike down
a criminal statute, Justice Potter Stewart suggested that it should. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 388 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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constitution theory. Given the tremendous expansion of the realm
of interstate commerce and the generality of the word "regulate" in
the commerce clause, state sovereignty cannot limit the exercise of
the commerce power, even assuming continued adherence to a federal system. Twentieth-century conditions have led increasingly to
national efforts to solve problems and confirm the impossibility of
finding in the abstraction of the states' sovereignty any substantial
limitation on a direct exercise of the federal commerce power.
Pennhurst is the hardest to reconcile of the three cases. The
scope of pendent jurisdiction and its existence in the shadowy world
of state sovereignty under the eleventh amendment are the most arcane of the issues raised. Pennhurst shows that although state sovereignty must yield to direct exercises of a federal enumerated power,
the sovereignty of the states and their role in the federal union will
254
be recognized and preserved in other situations.
Bowsher, like Pennhurst, presents initially an arcane question, but
like Garcia, it involves the fundamental structural issue of the separation of powers. The most enduring and socially appealing feature of
the separation-of-powers idea, at least in the American context, is
that judges should be autonomous and that their power should be
protected from political encroachment. 255 Northern Pipeline should,
therefore, prove durable.
In the administrative law context, where executive officials and
legislative functions are mixed, the social commitment to the abstraction of separated powers is not discernible, except insofar as it
reflects a general commitment to the idea of a diffusion of power.
Thus, Bowsher and Chadha probably reflect judicial fear of the threat
of Congressional domination, or at least aggression, within the federal government. This fear is certainly greater now than at the time
of Humphrey's Executor.
Thus, historical developments and very general attitudes in society explain Garcia and Bowsher. To some extent, however, the two
explanations conflict. It would seem more reasonable for conservative judges to fear (and, therefore, to attempt to contain) expansive
federal power over state governments than Congress's few efforts to
control more precisely governmental functioning.
Developments under an historical constitution reflect not primarily the predilections of conservative judges but the demands of
the underlying social order. American society has demanded laws
and programs from the federal government, ranging from farm sup254
Recall that Pennhurst may also be a disguised effort to further curtail the dockets
of the federal courts. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
255
See Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal CourtJurisdiction:An Opinionated
Guide to an Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 201 (1984).
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ports to health care for the elderly, that would be struck down or
limited ifjudges were to respond solely to a political abstraction like
the fear of central governmental power. Indeed, the ultimate explanation for Bowsher may be the Court's realization of its inability over
time to prevent federal government centralization. Given this result,
a revival of the desire for federal separation of powers was as inevitable as efforts by Congress to assert itself more forcefully in the
wonderland of federal benefits and programs.
If courts truly cannot resist the pressures for centralization, but
at the same time continue to reflect a social commitment to diffusion
of power, then Bowsher should have two contradictory consequences.
On the one hand, future judicial decisions will not alter significantly
the theoretically unclear role and power of independent commissions and agencies in the federal government; on the other hand,
the Court will continue to look for ways to confine formally the executive and legislative branches' respective spheres of operation,
particularly if one branch is perceived as seeking to change settled
practice.
Some, as they finish this essay, will think that I have allowed my
sense of the "is" in legal matters to defeat my sense, or Herbert
Wechsler's sense, of the "ought to be." They will feel that I have not
met Wechsler and others on the same plane, that is, I have not addressed what law is and how it ought to operate.
But in the case of law, the "ought to be" for which Wechsler
and others have argued is so hopelessly inadequate, even in basic
and fundamental areas, that it must be revised or treated as a myth.
The only revision which can face the "is" of our legal system is one
which accepts law as an organic feature of social organization and
which encourages the courts to recognize frankly their role-both
its possibilities and its limitations.

